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interrogation be delayed until the advisor arrives? Should the government
advise a potential defendant or even a taxpayer being audited that he
may be accompanied by his accountant or his attorney? The list could
go on. Tarlowski represents but one decision on a continuum, and cer-
tainly these questions will eventually be answered. The importance of
Tarlowski is in its extension of the term "liberty" to a new right for in-
dividuals under our adversary theory of justice. Today a man who is
being interrogated by a representative of the federal government may
request the presence of his attorney, accountant, psychiatrist, or even his
best friend and expect that request to be fulfilled.
Arthur H. Boelter
DOMESTIC RELATIONS-
ABROGATION OF INTERSPOUSAL IMMUNITY-
AN ANALYTICAL APPROACH
On April 12, 1968, Jacqueline Beaudette was injured while a passenger
in an automobile driven by Garry H. Frana. Miss Beaudette subsequently
filed a complaint alleging that the accident and the resulting injuries to
her person were caused by the negligence of Frana. After the action
commenced, but prior to the entry of judgment, Miss Beaudette and
Mr. Frana were married. The trial court, upon motion by the de-
fendant-husband, entered a summary judgment in his favor based upon
the absolute defense of interspousal immunity.' The Supreme Court of
Minnesota reversed, abrogating the absolute defense of interspousal im-
munity in tort actions. Beaudette v. Frana, - Minn. -, 173 N.W.2d
416 (1969).2
This decision is significant because it represents the most recent effort
by a state court of last resort to dismantle the defense of marital im-
munity-a doctrine which prevents an injured spouse from receiving due
satisfaction for injuries caused by the tortious conduct of the other spouse,
1. See Hovanetz v. Anderson, 276 Minn. 543, 148 N.W.2d 564 (1967); Karalis
v. Karalis, 213 Minn. 31, 4 N.W.2d 632 (1942); Kyle v. Kyle, 210 Minn. 204, 297
N.W. 744 (1941); Patenaude v. Patenaude, 195 Minn. 523, 263 N.W. 546 (1935);
Woltman v. Woltman, 153 Minn. 217, 189 N.W. 1022 (1922); Drake v. Drake,
145 Minn. 388, 177 N.W. 624 (1920); Strom v. Strom, 98 Minn. 427, 107 N.W.
1047 (1906).
2. The case under analysis was consolidated for trial with the case of Green v.
Green, - Minn. -, 173 N.W.2d 416 (1969). Since both cases involved sub-
stantially the same facts, the Minnesota Supreme Court made no distinction between
the two and held the same in both.
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whether such conduct occurs before or after marriage.3 The purpose of
this case note is to examine the doctrine of interspousal immunity and to
analyze critically both the reasoning of the Beaudette court and the
efficacy of its judgment.
At common law husband and wife were considered to be one legal
person-the husband.4  Hence, neither spouse could maintain an action
against the other.5 However, in the nineteenth century the individual
rights of married women were recognized by the passage of the Married
Women's Emancipation Acts, which conferred "upon married women
the separate ownership and control of their own property, including
their choses in action, and the capacity to sue or be sued without joinder
of the husband."6  Since these statutes were directed toward freeing
married women from their husbands' control in property matters, the
courts have generally agreed that a wife can maintain an action against
her husband for any tort to her property interests. 7 Marked differences in
3. See Alabama-Johnson v. Johnson, 201 Ala. 41, 77 So. 335 (1917); Alaska
-Cramer v. Cramer, 379 P.2d 95 (Alaska 1963); Arkansas-Leach v. Leach,
227 Ark. 599, 300 S.W.2d 15 (1957); California-Klein v. Klein, 58 Cal. 2d 692,
376 P.2d 70 (1962); Colorado-Rains v. Rains, 97 Colo. 19, 46 P.2d 740 (1935);
Connecticut-Brown v. Brown, 88 Conn. 42, 89 A. 889 (1914); Idaho-Lorange v.
Hays, 69 Idaho 440, 209 P.2d 733 (1949); Kentucky-Brown v. Gosser, 262 S.W.2d
480 (Ky. 1953); New Hampshire-Gilman v. Gilman, 78 N.H. 4, 5 A. 657 (1915);
New York-Coster v. Coster, 289 N.Y. 438, 46 N.E.2d 509 (1943); codified by,
N.Y. GEN. OBLIGATIONS LAW § 3-313 (1964); North Carolina-Jernigan v. Jernigan,
236 N.C. 430, 72 S.E.2d 912 (1952); codified by, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-5 (1965);
North Dakota-Fitzmaurice v. Fitzmaurice, 62 N.D. 191, 242 N.W. 526 (1932);
Oklahoma-Courtney v. Courtney, 184 Okla. 395, 87 P.2d 660 (1938); South Caro-
lina-Pardue v. Pardue, 167 S.C. 129, 166 S.E. 101 (1932); South Dakota-Scot-
vold v. Scotvold, 68 S.D. 53, 298 N.W. 266 (1941); Wisconsin-Fehr v. General
Accident, F. & L. Assurance Corp. Ltd., 246 Wis. 228, 16 N.W.2d 787 (1944);
codified by, WIs. STAT. ANN. § 246.075 (1967).
4. 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 442 (1768): "By marriage, the husband and
wife are one person in law; that is, the very being or legal existence of the woman
is suspended during marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated into that
of the husband." See also McCurdy, Personal Injury Torts Between Spouses, 4
VILL. L. REV. 303, 303-307 (1959).
5. The grounds for a denial of relief in suits between spouses was clearly an-
nounced in Phillips v. Barnett, 1 Q.B.D. 436 (1876) wherein a woman after
divorce sued her former husband for alleged assaults and batteries committed during
coverture. The court held no action would lie. Justice Blackburn stated: "[T]he
objection to the action is not merely with regard to the parties, but a requirement
of law founded upon the principle that the husband and wife are one person."
Accord, Norris v. Lantz & Hyde, 18 Md. 260 (1861); Ferrar v. Bessey, 24 Vt. 89
(1852).
6. See PROSSER, §116 at 881 (3d ed. 1964). See also infra note 12.
7. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Hamilton, 255 Ala. 284, 51 So.2d 13 (1950); Hub-
bard v. Ruff, 97 Ga. App. 251, 103 S.E.2d 134 (1958); Larison v. Larison, 9 Ill.
App. 27 (1881); Moreau v. Moreau, 250 Mass. 110, 145 N.E. 43 (1924); Whiting
1970] CASE NOTES
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
judicial interpretation of these acts, however, have called into question
their applicaton with respect to interspousal personal injury suits. Since
only a few states have passed legislation conclusively resolving this prob-
lem,8 there is to date remaining within the judiciary a distinct polarization
of views: a majority of jurisdictions precluding the actions and a
minority of jurisdictions allowing interspousal action.9 By analogy, the
majority of courts preclude a husband from bringing suit against his wife,
and the minority allow such suits. 10
The courts of the majority have used four arguments to sustain the doc-
trine of interspousal immunity: (1) The Married Women's Acts are in
derogation of the common law and are thus to be strictly construed so as
to preclude a wife from maintaining a personal injury action against her
husband; (2) the criminal and divorce courts provide adequate remedies
to redress the wrong which has been committed; (3) to allow interspousal
actions in tort would lead to the disruption of domestic harmony; and
(4) if the action were allowed, the relationship of the parties would pro-
vide a basis for spurious suits brought solely to defraud the insurance com-
pany covering the wrongdoer." The minority courts, on the other hand,
have rejected each of these arguments and contend that the doctrine of
interspousal immunity should be abrogated. This case note will critically
evaluate the positions taken by both the majority and the minority with
respect to each of these arguments.
It is fundamental, in understanding the position of the majority and
minority courts within the area of interspousal immunity, to examine the
reasoning used by each side in construing the Married Women's Acts.' 2
v. Whiting, 114 Me. 382, 96 A. 500 (1916); Carpenter v. Carpenter, 154 Mich. 100,
117 N.W. 598 (1908); Madget v. Madget, 850 Ohio App. 18, 87 N.E.2d 918 (1949);
Bruner v. Hart, 178 Okla. 222, 62 P.2d 513 (1936); Freiler v. Kear, 126 Pa. 470,
17 A. 668 (1889); Good v. Good, 39 W. Va. 357, 19 S.E. 382 (1894).
8. N.Y. GEN. OBLIGATIONS LAW §3-313; N.C. GEN. STAT. §52-5; WIs. STAT.
ANN. §246.075. All of these statutes allow the action in tort to be maintained.
Contra, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68,, § 1 (1969), which specifically denies the action in
torts between the spouses.
9. See supra note 3.
10. See Leach v. Leach, supra note 3.
11. See generally, Farage, Recovery for Torts between Spouses, 10 IND. L. J. 290
(1935); Jayme, Interspousal Immunity: Revolution and Counterrevolution in
American Tort Conflicts, 40 S. CAL. L. REV. 307 (1967); Keegan, Family and Tort
Actions: Liability and Immunity, 1962 U. ILL. L.F. 557; McCurdy, Torts Between
Persons in Domestic Relations, 43 HARV. L. REV. 1030 (1930); McCurdy, Property
Torts between Spouses and Use During Marriage of the Matrimonial Home
Owned by the Other, 2 VILL. L. REV. 447 (1957); Sanford, Personal Torts within
the Family, 9 VAND. L. REv. 823 (1956).
12. These statutes are collected at 3 VENIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS, §§ 167,
179, 180 (1935), and are discussed in McCurdy, supra note 4.
[Vol. )XX
The leading case explaining the position taken by the majority of juris-
dictions is Thompson v. Thompson.13 In an action brought by a wife
against her husband for personal injuries she sustained, the United States
Supreme Court was called upon to interpret the meaning of a District of
Columbia statute authorizing married women, "to sue separately for the
recovery, security, or protection of their property, and for torts com-
mitted against them, as fully and as freely as if they were unmarried.' 14
In upholding the doctrine of interspousal immunity, the Supreme Court
stated:
The statute was not intended to give a right of action as against the husband, but
to allow the wife, in her own name, to maintain actions of tort which, at common
law, must be brought in the joint names of herself and her husband. 1 5
In reaching this conclusion, the Court reasoned that the legislature must
clearly indicate within the terms of the statute its intention to abolish a
rule established at the common law. 16 The Court may only interpret
and apply the law to the facts of a given case; they cannot imply an intent
of a legislature. 17
In those jurisdictions which still adhere to the doctrine of inter-
spousal immunity, the construction placed on the District of Columbia
statute by the Supreme Court in Thompson is consistent with their inter-
pretation of the proper roles to be played by the judiciary and the legisla-
ture. 18 The Iowa Supreme Court, for example, indicated in Flogel v.
13. 218 U.S. 611 (1910).
14. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CODE, 31 STAT. 1189 § 1155 (1901); as found
today in D.C. CODE § 30-208 (1961).
15. Supra note 13, at 617. Accord, Strom v. Strom, supra note 1, at 428, 107
N.W. at 1048, wherein the Supreme Court of Minnesota stated: "This statute gives
to a married woman the same right of action in her own name for any injuries sus-
tained to her reputation, person, or property as her husband has in his own name to
maintain an action for like injuries sustained by him, and no other or greater right.
The purpose of the statute was to place the husband and wife on an equality as to
actions by either for injuries to person, reputation or property. The husband
cannot and never could bring an action against his wife for a personal tort com-
mitted by her against him during coverture. It follows that the statute does not
authorize her to bring an action against him for a personal tort committed by him
against her during coverture for her rights in this respect are expressly limited by the
statute to the rights to which the law gives to him."
16. Supra note 13. See also Paulus v. Bauder, 106 Cal. App. 2d 589, 235 P.2d
422 (1951); Karalis v. Karalis, supra note 1; Rogers v. Rogers, 265 Mo. 200, 177
S.W. 382 (1915); Willott v. Willott, 333 Mo. 896, 62 S.W.2d 1084 (1933); Mor-
rissett v. Morrissett, 80 Nev. 566, 397 P.2d 184 (1964).
17. Supra note 13.
18. See, e.g., Sink v. Sink, 172 Kan. 217, 239 P.2d 933 (1952); Hudson v.
Hudson, 226 Md. 521, 174 A.2d 339 (1961); Ensminger v. Ensminger, 222 Miss. 799,
77 So.2d 308 (1955).
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Flogel'9 that the Married Women's Acts were not enacted for the purpose
of allowing a wife to sue her husband in tort, but rather that the doctrine
of interspousal immunity must remain in force until the legislature takes
positive steps to declare its demise.20 Thus, the majority contends that it
is the duty of the legislature, not the courts, to effectuate any departure
from the common law rule of interspousal immunity.
As the decision in Thompson serves the majority jurisdictions, so also
the Supreme Court of Connecticut's decision in Brown v. Brown21 serves
the minority. The Connecticut court, in construing the Connecticut's
Married Women's Act, 22 held that the act not only liberated the woman
from her husband in her rights of contract, but also gave her those rights
which she enjoyed prior to coverture. The court stated:
In marriages which have occurred since the Act took effect the parties retain
their legal identity, and their civil rights are to be thus established. These rights
... are the same as they were before marriage. The statute leaves nothing to
implication. 23
The court went on to .say that it is immaterial whether the statute confers
on the wife the right to sue her husband in tort, for "these are rights
which belonged to her before marriage, and. . . are not lost by the fact of
marriage. ''24
In examining both the majority and minority courts' construction of
these statutes in their most favorable light, the position taken by the
minority courts is undoubtedly more consistent. While the majority would
sever the fictional unity of husband and wife with respect to interspousal
property suits, they deny the right of a woman, qua woman, to sue her
spouse in a tort action. But as the minority courts have pointed out, the
Married Women's Acts serve to separate completely the legal identity of
the husband and wife, and thus a wife has the right to sue her husband
either in tort or property.
19. 257 Iowa 547, 133 N.W.2d 907 (1965).
20. Id. Accord, Brief for Appellee at 13, Beaudette v. Frana, - Minn. -,
173 N.W.2d 416 (hereinafter cited as Beaudette), where it is stated: "The legisla-
tive approach has a recognized advantage over the judicial approach in its being
flexible and able to make provision for the ramifications and consequences of
any change in law that is being made." See also Peck, The Role of the Courts and
Legislatures in the Reform of Tort Law, 48 MINN. L. REV. 265 (1963).
21. 88 Conn. 42, 89 A. 889 (1914).
22. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. ch. 809, § 46-9 (1958).
23. Supra note 21, at 47, 89 A. at 891.
24. Compare Brown v. Brown, supra note 21, at 47, 89 A. at 891, with
O'Grady v. Potts, 193 Kan. 644, 396 P.2d 285 (1964), where the Kansas Supreme
Court held that prior to the marriage, the wife had an accrued property right (her
chose in action) which was protected under the Married Women's Act, and so
could not be denied by the doctrine of interspousal immunity.
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Apart from construing legislation to facilitate an adherence to the doc-
trine of interspousal immunity, the majority courts have posed, and the
minority courts have rebutted, the contention that the injured spouse is
not left without a remedy. Although precluded in the majority courts
from maintaining an action in tort, the injured spouse may seek relief in
the criminal courts. This view, presented quite early in the controversy,25
holds that the injuries sustained are afforded adequate relief through
prosecution by the state for the violation of a right charged with the state's
keeping.
Furthermore, some courts have held that a suit for divorce also provides
the wife with an adequate remedy for interspousal torts. For example, in
Abbott v. Abbott,26 a wife brought an action against her husband for
false imprisonment. The Maine Supreme Court realized the non-com-
pensating effect of a criminal prosecution, but the court sustained the
majority jurisdictions' position and upheld the doctrine of interspousal
immunity. The court stated that if the injury be so great, the wronged
spouse has an adequate remedy by suing for a divorce. If this is done
by a wife, then the decree, when entered, would entitle her to dower in
her husband's estate, and "all her needs and all her cause of complaint,
including any cruelties suffered, can be considered by the court, and com-
pensation in the nature of alimony for them .... ,,27 The Abbott court
would, therefore, expand the majority jurisdictions' proposition that the
criminal prosecution provides a remedy either supplemental, or as an
alternative, to a suit for a divorce; when the two are taken together, an
adequate remedy is available to the injured spouse. 28
The weakness of the majority's argument is seen not only in the re-
buttal by the courts of the minority, but also by the fact that today it has
all but vanished from any case considering interspousal immunity. The
minority courts have seen the adequate remedies argument as "illusory
and inadequate, ' 29 in that a criminal prosecution of the tort-feasor, or a
suit for divorce, neither compensates for damages done, nor encompasses
all torts that may be committed. 30 Furthermore, the minority courts point
out that the criminal remedy postulated by the majority can only be in-
25. Bandfield v. Bandfield, 117 Mich. 80, 75 N.W. 287 (1898); Drake v. Drake,
supra note 1; Austin v. Austin, 136 Miss. 61, 100 So. 591 (1924); Gowin v.
Gowin, 295 S.W. 211 (Tex. 1927); Nickerson v. Nickerson, 65 Tex. 281 (1886).
26. 67 Me. 304 (1877).
27. Id. at 307. See also Rogers v. Rogers, supra note 16.
28. Supra note 26.
29. Johnson v. Johnson, supra note 3.
30. Damum v. Elyria Lodge No. 465, 158 Ohio St. 107, 107 N.E.2d 337 (1952).
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stituted for violations of criminal statutes prescribing penalties for actions
solely intentional in nature. Also, the wrongdoer, though subject to fine
or imprisonment, cannot be made to compensate directly to the injured
spouse for the damages suffered. Thus, though subsequent conduct may
be prevented, that of the past is left unsatisfied.31
Divorce is also not the remedy the early majority courts thought it
would be: first, negligent conduct is not a ground for divorce; second,
the religious doctrine of the injured spouse may prevent attempting to
secure a divorce;3 2 and finally, the divorce action, to be compensatory,
must be brought by the wife and not the husband. Thus divorce, though
it may be a remedy, can never be the remedy which an action in tort
could provide.
The next argument advanced by the courts of the majority asserts that
actions between spouses would destroy the peace and tranquility of the
home.33 This argument, as the Maryland court stated in David v. David,34
is based
upon the broader "sociological and political" ground that [suits between spouses]
would introduce into the home, the basic unit of organized society, discord, sus-
picion and distrust, and would be inconsistent with the common welfare. 35
The validity of this contention rests on the majority jurisdictions' conclu-
sive presumption that the promotion of marital harmony is a necessary
requirement to the furtherance of a viable society. By abrogating the
doctrine of interspousal immunity, the courts would be encouraging a hus-
band and wife to sue each other for "real or fanciful wrongs." This would
place an additional burden upon the marital relationship and "the
home may well be split apart by the adversary roles which the spouses will
be required to assume."36  Thus, by retaining the doctrine, the majority
courts have achieved the objective of preserving family unity and thereby
have fulfilled public policy requirements.3 7
31. Goode v. Martinis, 58 Wash. 2d 229, 361 P.2d 941 (1961). Though up-
holding the doctrine of interspousal immunity this court rejected the contention
that adequate remedies could be found in the criminal or divorce courts.
32. See Comment, 36 S. CAL. L. REV. 456 (1963).
33. See, e.g., Holman v. Holman, 73 Ga. App. 205, 35 S.E.2d 923 (1945);
Hamilton v. Fulkerson, 285 S.W.2d 642 (Mo. 1955); Deatherage v. Deatherage,
328 S.W.2d 624 (Mo. 1959); Castelluci v. Castelluci, 96 R.I. 34, 188 A.2d 467(1963); Smith v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 174 So.2d 122 (La.
1965); Lillienkamp v. Rippetoe, 133 Tenn. 57, 179 S.W. 628 (1915).
34. 161 Md. 532, 157 A. 755 (1932).
35. Id. at 535, 157 A. at 756. Accord, Taibi v. DeGenaro, 65 N.J. Super. 294,
167 A.2d 667 (1961).
36. Lyons v. Lyons, 2 Ohio St. 2d 243, 244, 208 N.E.2d 533, 535 (1965).
37. Kennedy v. Camp, 14 N.J. 390, 102 A.2d 595 (1954); Kaczorowski v. Kal-
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The courts of the minority have accepted the preservation of "domestic
peace and tranquility" as an expression of sound public policy, but con-
tend that the statement of this objective does not answer the pertinent
question, which is:
Does denying a wife [or husband] the right to file against her husband [or his
wife] a meritorious suit for personal injuries contribute to any appreciable degree
to the attainment of the laudable objective?3 8
The minority courts have responded negatively to this question. Judge
Crouch, in his dissenting opinion in Mertz v. Mertz, 39 expressed the
minority's position as follows:
Neither in the history of the rule of interspousal immunity nor in its operation is
there anything to indicate that that policy is founded upon a definite view-or
even upon some feeling-that justice or the public welfare would be affected by a
contrary rule . . . . It is enough to say that the rule exists merely as a product
of judicial interpretation, is vestigial in character, and embodies no tenable policy
of morals or of social welfare. 40
He concluded by indicating that the doctrine of interspousal immunity
survives, not because of the necessity to preserve domestic harmony, but
because of the inability of the majority courts to realize the shallowness
and inequality of the doctrine.
In supporting the argument that the doctrine of interspousal immunity
does not preserve domestic harmony, the minority courts have chided
the majority for its failure to distinguish an action brought upon an
intentional tort, from an action brought upon a negligent tort.
When considering an intentional tort, such as assault and battery, the
minority courts have held that it would be difficult to conceive that any
type of peace and tranquility remains which the personal injury action
could destroy. 41  This contention was clearly stated in the Oregon case
of Apitz v. Dames.42 In an action brought by the executor of decedent-
wife's estate against the administrator of decedent-husband's estate for
damages resulting from the murder of decedent-wife by decedent-husband,
the court said:
The chief reason relied upon by all these courts [referring to the majority courts],
however, is that personal tort actions between husband and wife would disrupt
kosinski, 321 Pa. 438, 184 A. 663 (1936); Lunt v. Lunt, 121 S.W.2d 445 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1938); Poling v. Poling, 116 W. Va. 187, 179 S.E. 604 (1935).
38. Brown v. Gosser, supra note 3, at 483-84.
39. 271 N.Y. 466, 3 N.E.2d 597 (1936).
40. Id. at 476, 3 N.E.2d at 601.
41. See, e.g., Self v. Self, 58 Cal. 2d 683, 376 P.2d 65 (1962); Bushnell v. Bush-
nell, 103 Conn. 583, 131 A. 432 (1925).
42. 205 Or. 242, 287 P.2d 585 (1955).
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and destroy the peace and harmony of the home, which is against the policy of
the law. This is on the bald theory that after a husband has beaten his wife,
there is a state of peace and harmony left to be disturbed; and that if she is suf-
ficiently injured or angry to sue him for it, she will be soothed and deterred from
reprisals by denying her the legal remedy . . . . 43
Thus the language of the Apitz court clearly shows that the intentional tort
breeds disharmony, and, therefore, should not be within the purview of
interspousal immunity.
When considering interspousal torts based upon negligence, the mi-
nority holds that though domestic harmony would not be destroyed, the
maintenance of these actions should not be denied. They argue that
most of these actions are founded upon injuries sustained through auto-
mobile accidents wherein the negligent spouse-driver is covered by a lia-
bility insurance policy. 44 Therefore, the solidarity of marital relations
would be left unaffected because the insurance company, not the wrong-
doing spouse, would pay for the damages sustained.
Apart from the distinctions made by the minority courts with reference
to intentional and negligent tort actions, the minority jurisdictions have at-
tacked the majority courts' "domestic harmony" argument on one other
ground. The minority courts have pointed to the inconsistency in the ma-
jority's position in allowing actions for breach of contract, on a promissory
note, or for injury to property, but denying the personal injury action.45
The minority courts contend that if "domestic harmony" is disturbed by
the personal injury action, then it is also disturbed by property actions
as well. 46  Therefore, either all actions between spouses should be denied
as being contrary to public policy, or all should be allowed.
In attempting to defend its position against the minority's attacks, the
majority courts have remained silent except for the area of the negligent
tort. The majority jurisdictions' position in the situation where the ac-
tion is brought for negligence and the possibility of liability insurance
43. Id. at 264, 287 P.2d at 595.
44. Baits v. Baits, 273 Minn. 419, 142 N.W.2d 66 (1966). The court, with re-
gard to intra-family litigation, indicated that the negligent tort action is increas-
ingly founded upon the automobile accident where the driver carries liability insur-
ance. Thus the possibility of intra-family discord is greatly diminished.
45. See PROSSER, supra note 6, at 883, wherein Dean Prosser examines the in-
consistency of the majority courts' position which would preclude a spouse from
bringing an action in tort for personal injuries because this will preserve domes-
tic harmony, while allowing an action for divorce, or for a tort to property, or a
criminal prosecution on the same basis.
46. Katzenberg v. Katzenberg, 183 Ark. 626, 37 S.W.2d 696 (1931); Ginsberg
v. Ginsberg, 126 Conn. 146, 9 A.2d 812 (1939); Roberts v. Roberts, 310 S.W.2d 55
(Ky. 1958); Combs v. Combs, 262 S.W.2d 821 (Ky. 1953).
[Vol. XIX
1970] CASE NOTES 599
exists was best expressed by the Supreme Court of Utah in Rubalcava v.
Gisseman.47 In an action brought by a wife against the estate of her
deceased husband, for injuries sustained to her as a result of the decedent's
negligence, the court stated:
[To argue that] discord will not be engendered when the insurance company is to
pay, is neither sound nor entirely realistic. The question of liability can be as-
certained justly only upon its own merits. Whether there is insurance or not is
immaterial to this determination. 4 8
This defense of the majority position is patently erroneous, for the Utah
Supreme Court is admitting that only by an examination upon the merits
can the question of liability be decided. Yet it would deny the wronged
spouse the right to try the cause of action on the merits.
The final argument of the majority courts is that the interspousal action,
if allowed, would provide an opportunity for spurious and collusive suits
between the spouses. 49 This contention is founded upon the fact that most
interspousal actions are brought for damages sustained by the injured
spouse because of the negligence of the other spouse. With the increase of
liability insurance, as exemplified by numerous interspousal automobile
accident cases, 50 it is the insurance company, although not named as a
party,5 ' which stands to lose. Because of the intimacy of the marital
47. 14 Utah 2d 344, 384 P.2d 389 (1963).
48. Id. at 348, 384 P.2d at 391. Accord, Boisvert v. Boisvert, 94 N.H. 357,
53 A.2d 515 (1947); Prince v. Prince, 205 Tenn. 451, 326 S.W.2d 908 (1959).
49. See Maine v. James Maine & Sons, 198 Iowa 1278, 1279, 201 N.W. 20, 21
(1924), wherein the court stated in denying the action: "The occasion for a con-
troversy of this character may be found in the fact .. .that the appellant company
carried a policy protecting it against liability for damages caused by the automo-
bile." See also Harvey v. Harvey, 239 Mich. 142, 146, 214 N.W. 305, 306 (1927),
wherein the court in holding that a wife cannot sue her husband for an injury
caused by his negligence stated: "We can conceive of circumstances where liability
insurance, carried by the husband, might prove the moving factor and not at all
disrupt connubial bliss in collecting from an insurance company." Cf., Newton
v. Webber, 119 Misc. 240, 196 N.Y.S. 113 (1922); Lubowitz v. Taitness, 293 Mass.
39, 198 N.E. 320 (1935).
50. See, e.g., Rains v. Rains, 97 Colo. 19, 46 P.2d 740 (1935); Sink v. Sink,
supra note 18; Schneider v. Schneider, 160 Md. 18, 152 A. 498 (1930); Holder v.
Holder, 384 P.2d 663 (Okla. 1962); Smith v. Smith, 205 Or. 286, 287 P.2d 572
(1955).
51. Horsford v. Carolina Glass Co., 92 S.C. 236, 258, 75 S.E. 533, 541 (1912),
wherein the court stated: "There can be no doubt on the bench or at the bar that
.. .both reason and authority forbid bringing into the evidence or argument the
fact that defendant is protected by . . . liability insurance. Such evidence or argu-
ment has a manifest and strong tendency to carry the jury away from the real issue
and to lead them to regard carelessly the legal rights of the defendant on the ground
that someone else will have to pay the verdict .... ." See also Wood v. England,
226 S.C. 73, 76, 83 S.E.2d 644, 645 (1954), wherein the court stated: "It is a well
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relationship and the existence of insurance, the majority courts hold that
the proceeding would loose its adversary nature, creating a strong in-
ducement to "trump up claims and conceal possible defenses."' 52 The
ultimate result of allowing such actions was expressed by Justice Sims in
his dissenting opinion in Brown v. Gosser.53 The dissent stated that to al-
low interspousal actions
encourages raids on insurance companies through unmeritorious claims which
never would be instituted where the husband did not carry liability insurance, thus
possibly raising insurance rates on thousands of honest persons for the benefit of a
fraudulent few. 5 4
Thus Justice Sims and the majority courts believe that the doctrine of
interspousal immunity is necessary to prevent collusive suits between
spouses.
The minority courts' position, with respect to the possibility of collusion
in interspousal litigation, has been best discussed by the California Su-
preme Court in Klein v. Klein.55 In an action brought by a wife for
personal injuries sustained because of the negligence of her husband, the
court recognized the majority courts' contention. The California Supreme
Court also realized, however, that the possibility of fraud and collusion
exists to some degree in all cases, and a right of action cannot be denied
merely because of this possibility.5 6 The courts must, therefore,
depend upon the efficacy of the judicial process to ferret out the meritorious from
the fraudulent claim in particular cases. If those processes prove inadequate, the
problem becomes one for the Legislature. Courts will not immunize tortfeasors
from liability in a whole class of cases because of the possibility of fraud, but
will depend upon the Legislature to deal with the problem as a question of public
policy.5 7
The court in Klein and the minority jurisdictions have clearly indicated a
much sounder basis for handling the problem of collusion in interspousal
tort actions. The minority courts' position is not only protective of the
spouse who does have a valid cause of action, but also attempts to indicate
where the solution to the possibility of fraud and collusion should lie in
the absence of judicial capability in dealing with the problem.
settled principal of law . . . that . . . the offering of evidence or the argument of
counsel to the jury relative to insurance is highly improper and warrants the Court
declaring a mistrial . .. .
52. Supra note 36, at 245, 208 N.E.2d at 536.
53. Brown v. Gosser, supra note 3.
54. Brown v. Gosser, supra note 3, at 485.
55. Klein v. Klein, supra note 3.
56. Klein v. Klein, supra note 3.
57. Klein v. Klein, supra note 3, at 695-96, 376 P.2d at 73 (emphasis added).
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These are the arguments of both the majority and minority courts which
the Supreme Court of Minnesota was confronted with in the case of
Beaudette v. Frana.58 In choosing to abrogate the doctrine of interspousal
immunity, the Beaudette court founded its decision upon two Minne-
sota cases, which dealt more broadly with the area of intra-family im-
munity. In Balts v. Balts"9 and Silesky v. Kelman,60 the Minneosta Su-
preme Court abrogated the parent-child and child-parent immunities re-
spectively. These cases formulated the rationale adopted by Beaudette:
the social gain to be derived from the, "financial protection for those
whom an insured wrongdoer ordinarily has the most natural motive to
protect transcends the more intangible social loss of impairing the integrity
of the family relationship.""'
Apart from this public policy argument, Beaudette recognized the possi-
bility of collusion in suits between spouses. To minimize collusion the
burden is placed upon the court to act "promptly and firmly at any ap-
pearance of frivolous or fraudulent interspousal claims."'' 2 In each case,
therefore, it is the court which must question the substance of the claim
presented, within the intimate relationship of marriage, and strike a deli-
cate balance between the wrong committed and the risk of collusion. In
the final analysis, the possibility of collusive suits must be tested by the
experience of future litigation to determine whether the proper balance of
social interest has been achieved. 63
The Beaudette decision has not left the Minnesota courts without tools
to control interspousal litigation. Though the doctrine of interspousal im-
munity has been abrogated, the plaintiff-spouse, when bringing an action
upon an intentional tort, will not recover unless substantial evidence is
introduced showing that the "injurious contact was plainly excessive or a
gross abuse of normal privilege."'64 Thus Beaudette has placed a burden
upon the injured spouse which has never before been imposed by the
other minority courts. By excluding those torts intentionally committed,
but occurring as part of the marital union, the court has not only pro-
hibited vexatious litigation, but has also protected the integrity of the
valid interspousal suit.
In order to balance the restraints against collusive litigation with the
58. Beaudette, supra note 20.
59. Supra note 44.
60. 281 Minn. 431, 161 N.W.2d 631 (1968).
61. Beaudette, supra note 20, at -, 173 N.W.2d at 419.
62. Beaudette, supra note 20, at -, 173 N.W.2d at 420.
63. Beaudette, supra note 20.
64. Beaudette, supra note 20, at -, 173 N.W.2d at 420.
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protection afforded the plaintiff-spouse, the court in Beaudette has speci-
fied that the defense of assumption of risk is available to the wrongdoing
spouse when the suit sounds in negligence.6 5 Thus the courts of Minne-
sota will not need to rely exclusively upon their own perceptiveness to
discern the valid from the collusive, or spurious, suit. By allowing the
defendant-spouse to use assumption of risk as a defense, the ordinary
household accident, or even the automobile accident, may not give rise to
a recovery, for these are matters upon which spouses, perhaps, assume
the risk when entering into the marriage contract.6
The reasoning and the conclusion of the Beaudette court are sound.
The court has not only abrogated the doctrine of interspousal immunity,
but also has established guidelines by which the Minnesota courts can prop-
erly judge the efficacy of tort actions between spouses. Judicial abroga-
tion of the doctrine of interspousal immunity, however, is not the sole
means to the resolution of the problem,6 7 nor is it the most expeditious
method by which the doctrine can be confronted. Judicial action to
abolish the doctrine of interspousal immunity may lead to legislative
reaction in abrupt derogation of the court's decision. For example, the
Illinois court in Brandt v. Keller68 departed from prior Illinois case law69
and abrogated the doctrine of interspousal immunity. This decision ap-
parently turned Illinois away from the majority position. In 1953,
just one year after Brandt, the General Assembly amended the Illinois
Married Women's Act, to leave no doubt that the legislature intended the
doctrine of interspousal immunity to remain in force.7 0
With the statutory resolution of the doctrine of interspousal immunity,
Illinois returned to its pre-Brandt status. The attempted judicial action
did not lead to a termination of the conflict, but to an awakening of the
same. Therefore, the Minnesota Supreme Court may ultimately find it-
self defending a doctrine which it had previously renounced. This pros-
pect, however, does not seem highly probable, for Illinois represents a
clear minority of one.
65. Beaudette, supra note 20.
66. Courtney v. Courtney, supra note 3.
67. Supra note 8.
68. 413 Ill. 503, 109 N.E.2d 729 (1952).
69. Welch v. Davis, 410 Ill. 130, 101 N.E.2d 547 (1951); Chestnut v. Chest-
nut, 77 Ill. 346 (1875); Tallios v. Tallios, 345 Ill. App. 387, 103 N.E.2d 507 (1952).
70. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68, § 1 (1969), which states: "A married woman
may, in all cases, sue and be sued without joining her husband with her, to the
same extent as if she were unmarried; provided, that neither husband nor wife may
sue the other for a tort to the person committed during coverture." (Emphasis
added).
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The criteria advanced by the majority and minority courts, and the
reasoning of the Minnesota Supreme Court in Beaudette, do not encom-
pass all of the methods which may be used to deal with the problems cre-
ated by the doctrine of interspousal immunity. The problem of collusion,
for example, could be somewhat resolved by the passage of an "Automo-
bile Guest Statute."' 71 Such a statute would preclude an injured passenger
in an automobile accident from bringing an action against the negligent
driver, absent gross negligence or intentional misconduct.
In the absence of an applicable state statute, 72 another alternative could
be that the contract of insurance contain limitations excluding a spouse, or
other family member, from coverage. 73  Therefore, where an insurance
company has initially assumed the risk of covering the injured spouse and
has derived the full benefit of the policy premiums, it would not be pro-
tected from its own improvidence.
A final alternative, most applicable to the collusion argument, was ex-
pressed by the Missouri court in the case of Brawner v. Brawner.74
The court stated that:
[A]ccident insurance coverage would be preferable to liability insurance. While the
protection is limited to pecuniary losses. . . . including those resulting from automo-
bile accidents, it is not dependent upon human fault and does not put the married
couple in any adversary position as a prerequisite for recovery.
7 5
Thus, by replacing liability insurance coverage with accident insurance
coverage, the majority courts' position with reference to collusion would
be greatly weakened, since it would be unnecessary.
As noted before, the doctrine of interspousal immunity is "vestigial in
character and embodies no tenable policy of morals or of social welfare."'76
The doctrine exists, not because of the fear of domestic disharmony or
collusion, but only because the majority courts refuse to depart from
precedent.
71. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 952, § 9-201 (1969), which states: "No
person riding in or upon a motor vehicle or motorcycle as a guest . . . nor his
personal representative in the event of the death of such guest, shall have a cause
of action for damages against the driver . . . unless such accident shall have
been caused by the wilful and wanton misconduct of the driver ....
72. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. 474 § 1 (1969), and MINN. STAT. 713 § 3 (1969),
wherein the legislature has prohibited household-exclusion clauses in liability insur-
ance policies and also has provided for the inclusion of supplemental accident
indemnity coverage for members of the household in automobile liability policies.
73. Courtney v. Courtney, supra note 3.
74. 327 S.W.2d 808 (Mo. 1959).
75. Id. at 814.
76. Mertz v. Mertz, supra note 39, at 476, 3 N.E.2d at 601.
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The courts of the minority, and most recently the court in Beaudette,
have recognized the necessity to break from tradition. They have effec-
tively rebutted the criteria developed by the majority courts. This step
is clearly a positive one, for the law can only function when it affords a
means to hear the complaints of all of its subjects. Thus, the fiction
of marital unity should no longer be used to prevent the furtherance of a
goal of society: the promotion of harmony through justice.
Daniel E. Wanat
INSURANCE-EXCESS EXPOSURE-INSURER'S
DUTY TO ADVISE INSURED OF HIS
RIGHT TO CONTRIBUTE
John F. Kiely was fatally injured when struck by a truck owned by
Nathan and Manuel Brockstein and driven by Irving Bloom, an employee
of the Brocksteins. Kiely's estate sued the Brocksteins and Bloom on two
causes of action, one for wrongful death, asking $50,000 for the widow,
and the other claiming $500,000 for decedent's pain and suffering. The
Brocksteins were insured by Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company for
bodily injury liability arising out of the use of the truck. The maximum
coverage for any one person was $50,000. Settlement negotiations col-
lapsed, and a judgment was finally entered for $106,413.33.1 Nation-
wide paid $50,000, plus costs and interest of $8,847.81. The balance of
the judgment was settled by the payment of $25,000 by the Brocksteins.
The Brocksteins then brought an action against Nationwide on the
theory that the insurer did not properly represent the interests of the in-
sured in its efforts to settle the case. The United States District Court
for the Eastern District of New York entered judgment for Nationwide.
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals reversed and remanded,
holding that the insurer was guilty of bad faith because the insurer did
not advise the insured during the settlement negotiations that he could
contribute toward a settlement within the policy limits. Brockstein v.
Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company, 417 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1969)
(hereinafter cited as Brockstein II).
The significance of this decision is that in situations where a claim
potentially exceeds policy limits, and a settlement demand is made within
1. Brochstein v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 266 F. Supp. 223 (E.D. N.Y. 1967)
[hereinafter cited as Brockstein I]. Note that the spelling of this case title differs
from the spelling of the title in the appellate court, Brockstein v. Nationwide Mut.
Ins. Co., 417 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1969) [hereinafter cited as Brockstein I]; the
"Brockstein" spelling will be used in this note.
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